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UNITED STATES V. WASHINGTON: WHY COUNSEL'S ADVICE
AND PRESENCE AT PRESENTENCE INTERVIEWS IS
NECESSARY TO PREVENT SENTENCING SUICIDE
INTRODUCTION
Courts have long agreed that to ensure a fair and just judicial sys-
tem, defendants have a right to counsel in certain criminal proceedings.'
However, courts have struggled to form a consensus over the exact pro-
ceedings to which this right attaches.2 Before the implementation of the
United States Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines), courts did not consid-
er presentence interviews a "critical" stage requiring a right to counsel.3
The Guidelines expanded the influence that a presentence report plays in
a defendant's sentence and likewise expanded the influence of probation
officers as authors of the report.4 Although courts maintain that routine
presentence interviews conducted under the Guidelines are not a "critical
stage" under Sixth Amendment jurisprudence,' some courts have argued
that the stage requires constitutional protection because of the increased
potential for prejudice, as well as the ability of counsel's presence at the
presentence interview to avoid or mitigate that prejudice.6
The Tenth Circuit has held that a Sixth Amendment right to counsel
does not apply to presentence interviews with probation officers.7 How-
ever, recently the Tenth Circuit re-examined the issue in United States v.
Washington, and held that while defendants do not have the right to
counsel's presence at a presentence interview with a probation officer,
they do have the right to counsel's advice about the nature, purpose, and
legal consequences of the interview.9 In doing so, the Tenth Circuit
acknowledged the importance of the proceeding, but refused to extend
I. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60-61 (1932).
2. See, e.g., Megan E. Bums, Note, The Presentence Interview and the Right to Counsel: A
Critical Stage Under the Federal Sentencing Structure, 34 WM. & MARY L. REV. 527, 550-54
(1993); Pamela R. Metzger, Beyond the Bright Line: A Contemporary Right-to-Counsel Doctrine, 97
Nw. U. L. REv. 1635, 1679-81 (2003).
3. See, e.g., Bums, supra note 2, at 530 (citing Brown v. Butler, 811 F.2d 938, 941 (5th Cir.
1987); Baumann v. United States, 692 F.2d 565, 578 (9th Cir. 1982)).
4. Metzger, supra note 2, at 1672.
5. See, e.g., United States v. Tyler, 281 F.3d 84, 96 (3d Cir. 2002) ("[N]o court has found the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies to routine presentence interviews.").
6. See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., When the Right to Counsel Begins, in CRIM. PROC.
§ 6.4(e) nn.106-09 (3d ed. 2011).
7. United States v. Gordon, 4 F.3d 1567, 1571-72 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v. Smith,
929 F.2d 1453, 1458 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v. Rogers, 921 F.2d 975, 981 82 (10th Cir.
1990).
8. 619 F.3d 1252, 1263 (10th Cir. 2010).
9. Id. at 1261.
477
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
the constitutional guarantee and instead created an unworkable rule that
fails to protect the Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
When conducted pursuant to the Guidelines, presentence interviews
with probation officers are a "critical" stage under Sixth Amendment
jurisprudence. This is due to the grave potential for prejudice that is in-
herent in presentence hearings with a probation officer and the ability of
counsel's presence to mitigate or avoid the prejudice.o Too often, unrep-
resented defendants commit sentencing suicide" by making unnecessary
admissions during a presentence interview that result in additional
months or years added to their sentence. 12 Counsel's presence at, in addi-
tion to advice about, a presentence interview, is necessary to protect
against the potential for prejudice. 3 If counsel is absent from the inter-
view, it is difficult for a defendant to meaningfully challenge findings in
a presentence report. Counsel's presence at a presentence interview
would significantly reduce the likelihood that a defendant would make
such unnecessary and incriminating admissions. 14
Part I of this Comment discusses the historical evolution of the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel, including the right to effective coun-
sel. It also examines changes in sentencing after the Guidelines were
adopted and provides an overview of previous decisions concerning the
critical nature of presentence interviews. Part II of this Comment de-
scribes the majority and dissenting opinions in Washington, which both
advocate for the Tenth Circuit to re-examine United States v. Gordon.15
Part III analyzes why the Tenth Circuit's holding created an unworkable
rule that fails to protect the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and argues
that presentence interviews with probation officers are a "critical" stage
of criminal proceedings under Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Right to Counsel Doctrine
The right to counsel was constitutionalized in the Sixth Amendment
to the United States Constitution, which provides that "in all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defence."16 However, belief in the rights guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment predated the constitutional amendment.17 Since first settling
10. Metzger, supra note 2, at 1676-80.
11. See In re Carter, 848 A.2d 281, 296 (Vt. 2004) ("The facts of this case are a clear example
of the importance of the presentence investigation and a criminal defendant's participation in the
development of the report. It is not an overstatement to say that petitioner committed sentencing
suicide in his [presentence] interview.").
12. See Metzger, supra note 2, at 1679.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 1678.
15. 4 F.3d 1567 (10th Cir. 1993).
16. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
17. See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 60-65 (1932).
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in this country, Americans have rejected the English system that prohib-
ited the assistance of counsel in most criminal cases.' 8 Instead, early
American colonists adopted protections to ensure defendants procedural
fairness in criminal proceedings.'9 Colonists recognized that "if a de-
fendant were forced to stand alone against the state, his case was fore-
doomed," 2 0 and this view is reflected in the right to counsel guaranteed in
the Sixth Amendment. 21 The Framers sought to level the playing field
between an experienced and powerful prosecutor22 and a criminal de-
fendant who lacks the "skill in arguing the law or in coping with an intri-
cate procedural system."23
In Powell v. Alabama,24 the Supreme Court held that the defendants,
nine young African American men accused of rape, were deprived of
their right to a fair trial "in any substantial sense," because the defend-
ants' counsel lacked the opportunity to investigate or prepare for the tri-
al.25 Justice Sutherland's opinion in Powell was the foundation of the
Supreme Court's Sixth Amendment right to counsel doctrine.26
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes
no skill in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable,
generally, of determining for himself whether the indictment is good
or bad. He is unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the
aid of counsel he may be put on trial without a proper charge, and
convicted upon incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the
issue or otherwise inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and
knowledge adequately to prepare for his defense, even though he
have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every
step in the proceedings against him.27
Although Powell's holding was limited to capital cases with an in-
digent defendant who lacks the ability to defend himself,28 the Supreme
Court has continued to refine and re-examine the guarantee in light of
18. Id. at 64-65.
19. Id. ("[I]n at least twelve of the thirteen colonies the rule of the English common law ...
had been definitely rejected and the right to counsel fully recognized in all criminal prosecu-
tions...."); Metzger, supra note 2, at 1638-39 (discussing methods colonies used to secure the
right to counsel, including by constitutional protection and right-to-counsel legislation).
20. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967).
21. Metzger, supra note 2, at 1640.
22. Id. at 1639-40.
23. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 307 (1973).
24. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
25. Id. at 57-58.
[Diuring perhaps the most critical period of the proceedings against these defendants, that
is to say, from the time of their arraignment until the beginning of their trial, when con-
sultation, thorough-going investigation and preparation were vitally important, the de-
fendants did not have the aid of counsel in any real sense.
26. Bums, supra note 2, at 533.
27. Powell, 287 U.S. at 69.
28. Id. at 71 (describing the defendant as "incapable adequately of making his own defense
because of ignorance, feeble-mindedness, illiteracy, or the like").
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"changing patterns of criminal procedure and investigation." 29 The Sixth
Amendment right to counsel is an evolving doctrine,3 0 and in expanding
it, the Supreme Court uses a "real-world," factual assessment of the
criminal proceeding asserted to be unfair." Under this assessment, the
Supreme Court expands the right "only when new contexts appear pre-
senting the same dangers that gave birth initially to the right itself."32 The
Supreme Court has expanded the Sixth Amendment right to counsel to
all criminal prosecutions where imprisonment may result. Additionally,
the Court has expanded the right to counsel to include proceedings both
before and after the actual trial,34 recognizing that the right to effective
assistance at trial is meaningless if that right is limited only to the formal
trial.35 Now, the Sixth Amendment right to counsel exists at all "critical"
- - 36stages of a criminal prosecution.
The Supreme Court has announced several elements that must be
present in a "critical" stage: (1) the stage must occur after the initiation
of adversarial proceedings; (2) the defendant must confront an adver-
sary; 37 and (3) the presence of counsel must be necessary to preserve the
defendant's right to a fair trial.3 ' To satisfy the third element, there must
29. See, e.g., United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 310 (1973).
30. See United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967) (noting the differences in "today's
law enforcement machinery" compared to the lack of organized police forces when the Bill of Rights
was adopted).
31. See Ash, 413 U.S. at 313 ("This review of the history and expansion of the Sixth Amend-
ment counsel guarantee demonstrates that the test utilized by the Court has called for examination of
the event in order to determine whether the accused required aid in coping with legal problems or
assistance in meeting his adversary.").
32. Id. at 311.
33. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25, 40
(1972).
34. See, e.g., Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 401 (1977) (postindictment interrogation);
Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9 (1970) (preliminary hearing); Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128,
137 (1967) (sentencing); Wade, 388 U.S. at 237 (1967) (pretrial lineups); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368
U.S. 52, 53 (1961) (arraignment).
35. Ash, 413 U.S. at 310.
36. Wade, 388 U.S. at 224 ("[O]ur cases have construed the Sixth Amendment guarantee to
apply to 'critical' stages of the proceedings.").
37. Ash, 413 U.S. at 310; Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 688-90 (1972).
The initiation of judicial criminal proceedings . . . is the starting point of our whole sys-
tem of adversary criminal justice. For it is only then that the government has committed
itself to prosecute, and only then that the adverse positions of government and defendant
have solidified. It is then that a defendant finds himself faced with the prosecutorial forc-
es of organized society, and immersed in the intricacies of substantive and procedural
criminal law. It is this point, therefore, that marks the commencement of the 'criminal
prosecutions' to which alone the explicit guarantees of the Sixth Amendment are applica-
ble.
Kirby, 406 U.S. at 689-690.
38. Wade, 388 U.S. at 226-27 ("In sum, the principle of Powell v. Alabama and succeeding
cases requires that we scrutinize any pretrial confrontation of the accused to determine whether the
presence of his counsel is necessary to preserve the defendant's basic right to a fair trial . . . .").
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be "potential substantial prejudice" in the stage and counsel's presence
would help the defendant mitigate or avoid the prejudice. 3 9
B. Right to Effective Counsel
Although the Powell Court intimated that the right to counsel in-
cluded a right to "effective" counsel,40 the right to challenge the quality
of counsel's assistance was not formally recognized until thirty years
after the Supreme Court's decision in Powell.4 1 In McMann v. Richard-
son,42 the Supreme Court affirmatively stated, "the right to counsel is the
right to the effective assistance of counsel."43 In Strickland v. Washing-
ton," the Supreme Court acknowledged that effective assistance is neces-
sary to ensure that criminal proceedings produce a just result 45 and an-
nounced standards for determining whether counsel's assistance amounts
to constitutionally deficient performance requiring the judgment's rever-
sal.46 Under Strickland, a defendant must show that counsel's perfor-
mance fell below the "objective standard of reasonableness,"47 meaning
below the range of "professionally competent assistance.""8 Counsel's
performance is measured against "prevailing professional norms."4 9 Ad-
ditionally, a defendant must also "show that the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense."50 The prejudice element requires a showing of
reasonable probability that but for counsel's deficient performance, the
proceeding's result would have been different.5 ' Courts presume that
counsel's conduct is reasonable and afford considerable deference when
scrutinizing such conduct. 5 2 However, a lawyer's mere presence at trial is
insufficient to satisfy the Sixth Amendment guarantee of effective coun-
sel.
39. Id. at 227 (analyzing "whether potential substantial prejudice to defendant's rights inheres
in the particular confrontation and the ability of counsel to help avoid that prejudice").
40. Powell v. Alabama, 278 U.S. 45, 71 (1932) (describing the court's duty to give "effective
aid in the preparation and trial of the case" (emphasis added)).
41. Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise ofthe Constitu-
tional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625, 629 (1986) ("[Bly
1964, the right to effective assistance in the qualitative sense was firmly imbedded in case law."
(citing Ion R. Waltz, Inadequacy of Trial Defense Representation as a Ground for Post-Conviction
Relief in Criminal Cases, 59 Nw. U. L. REV. 289, 289-91 (1964))).
42. 397 U.S. 759 (1970).
43. Id. at 771 n.14.
44. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
45. Id. at 685-86.
46. Id at 687.
47. Id. at 688.
48. Id at 690.
49. Id at 688.
50. Id at 687.
51. Id. at 694.
52. Id at 689 ("Judicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential.").
53. Id at 685 ("That a person who happens to be a lawyer is present at trial alongside the




By the end of the twentieth century, the federal criminal justice sys-
tem experienced significant changes, including the adoption of mandato-
ry minimum sentences and the Guidelines.5 4 Mandatory minimum sen-
tencing requires that courts impose specific mandatory terms of incarcer-
ation when a defendant is convicted of a crime that carries a mandatory
sentence. In 1984, Congress enacted mandatory sentencing, prescribing
mandatory sentences for certain drug- and gun-related offenses. 6 Since
the enactment of mandatory sentencing, Congress has expanded the
number of charges that carry mandatory sentences.57
Also in 1984, Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act,58 which
established the United States Sentencing Commission to generate an
effective and fair sentencing system that would better combat crime by
ensuring "honesty," "reasonable uniformity" and "proportionality" in
sentencing. 59 The Sentencing Commission developed and adopted the
Guidelines, and on November 1, 1987, the Commission's Guidelines
went into effect, introducing determinate sentencing to the federal sys-
tem.60
The prior system of indeterminate sentencing gave judges consider-
able discretion to impose tailored sentences based on a variety of factors,
including the defendant's background and likelihood of rehabilitation.6 1
Both mandatory sentencing and the Guidelines sought to remedy criti-
cisms that the old indeterminate sentencing scheme gave judges too
much discretion, creating disparate sentences for similar offenses, and
focusing too much on rehabilitating defendants without any means of
knowing whether a defendant was effectively rehabilitated.62 Under that
63
system, judges were only bound by maximum sentences, and the
presentence investigation report was merely a supplement used by the
judge in determining a sentence.64 Judges were not required to rely on
information contained in the report, and, if the defendant gave consent,
54. See Metzger, supra note 2, at 1657-58.
55. Id. at 1658.
56. Id.
57. Id
58. 28 U.S.C. § 994 (2006).
59. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 1, pt. A, subpart 1 (2004) (Original Introduc-
tion to the Guidelines Manual).
60. Id at subpart 2 ("[T]he guidelines took effect on November 1, 1987, and apply to all
offenses committed on or after that date."); see also Metzger, supra note 2, at 1659.
61. Bums, supra note 2, at 537-39.
62. See id at 539; see also Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging the Jury: The Criminal Jury's
Constitutional Role in an Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 33, 84 (2003).
63. See Bums, supra note 2, at 537 (citing Keith A. Findley & Meredith Ross, Comment,
Access, Accuracy and Fairness: The Federal Presentence Investigation Report Under Julian and the
Sentencing Guidelines, 1989 Wis. L. REV. 837, 840 (1989)).
64. Id. (citing Stanley A. Weigel, The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984: A Practical Appraisal,
36 UCLA L. REv. 83, 89 (1988)).
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the judge could impose a sentence without a presentence report.6 ' The
report contained both parties' accounts of the crime, as well as a psycho-
logical profile of the defendant and information about the defendant's
66
background, such as family and education.
In contrast, the Guidelines impose fixed sentencing ranges, which
are calculated according to specific instructions and based on the defend-
ant's offense level and criminal history.67 Offense level is calculated by
determining the appropriate Guideline section and the base offense level
within that section and then by taking into consideration the severity of
the offense and offender conduct. 69 The Guidelines only allow for certain
adjustments.7 0 Although the Supreme Court has held that the Guidelines
are merely advisory,7 ' in practice, federal judges have continued to view
the Guidelines as authoritative, and rarely select a sentence that falls out-
side the Guideline's prescribed range.7 2 Judges must make additional
fact-finding to justify a sentence ordered outside of the Guideline's
range,7 3 so despite the "advisory nature" of the recommendation, "[f]rom
a practical standpoint, district judges must give considerable weight to
presentence reports; the system could not function efficiently other-
- ,74wise.
Under the Guidelines, "[t]he probation officer must conduct a
presentence investigation and submit a report to the court before it im-
poses a sentence."75 The presentence report is now mandatory and, un-
like the reports taken under the indeterminate sentencing scheme, it con-
tains minimal information regarding the defendant's background. 76 Fur-
thermore, the report only contains a single version of the facts, which the
65. Id.
66. Id. (citing Findley & Ross, supra note 63, at 841).
67. Metzger, supra note 2, at 1659.
68. Bums, supra note 2, at 542.
69. Metzger, supra note 2, at 1659.
70. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § B1.1 (2004); see also id at § 3Al-3Cl
(describing adjustments based on actual relevant conduct, including: harm to the victim, the defend-
ant's role in the offense, obstruction of justice by the defendant, whether the defendant has accepted
personal responsibility, acts in furtherance of the offense, and other criminal activity related to other
charges).
71. See Booker v. United States, 543 U.S. 200, 246 (2005) (Breyer, J., dissenting in part).
72. Steven G. Kalar & Jon M. Sands, (Not So) Lovely Rita: A Non-Binding Presumption, for
Non-Binding Guidelines, for Our Non-Binding Constitution, 31 CHAMPION 32, 36 (2007).
73. Id. ("[A] trial judge will find it far easier to make the appropriate findings and sentence
within the appropriate Guideline, than to go through the unorthodox factfinding necessary to justify
a sentence outside the Guidelines range ..... (quoting Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 391
(2007))).
74. United States v. Herrera-Figueroa, 918 F.2d 1430, 1435 (9th Cir. 1990) (discussing the
substantial role that presentence interviews will continue to play in determining a defendant's sen-
tence).
75. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6Al1 (Presentence Report (Policy State-
ment)); see also id at § I B 1.1 (Application Instructions).
76. Bums, supra note 2, at 543-44.
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probation officer arrives at based on both parties' accounts.77 The proba-
tion officer then calculates the defendant's base offense level and crimi-
nal history category to arrive at the applicable sentencing range recom-
mendation and then provides the recommendation in a report to the
court.8 Under the Guidelines, judges rely heavily on the presentence
report's sentencing recommendation, in part because of the complexity
of the Guidelines, 79 and in part because of the additional fact-finding
required to justify a sentence ordered outside of the Guideline's range.so
2. The Debate over Whether a Right to Counsel Exists at a Presen-
tence Interview
Courts generally agreed that under the old indeterminate sentencing
system, presentence interviews were not a "critical" stage within Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence.81 Under the Guidelines, no federal court has
affirmatively applied a Sixth Amendment right to counsel to a routine,
non-capital presentence interview.82 However, the issue is not settled, as
some courts have expressed the view that presentence interviews con-
ducted under the Guidelines have become a "critical" stage under Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence. The Ninth Circuit has held that a Sixth
Amendment right to counsel exists at a presentence interview in a capital
case.84
Primarily basing their decisions on the non-adversarial role of the
probation officer, the Fourth, Fifth, 6 Sixth,8 Seventh," Ninth," and
77. Id. at 544 (citing Susan K. Grunin & Jud Watkins, The Investigative Role of the United
States Probation Officer Under Sentencing Guidelines, 51 FED. PROBATION 43, 44 (1987)).
78. Id.
79. Id; see also infra Part 11I.B.
80. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
81. See, e.g., Bums, supra note 2, at 530 (citing Brown v. Butler, 811 F.2d 938, 941 (5th Cir.
1987); Baumann v. United States, 692 F.2d 565, 578 (9th Cir. 1982)).
82. See United States v. Tyler, 281 F.3d 84, 96 (3d Cir. 2002) ("[N]o court has found the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel applies to routine presentence interviews."); see also United
States v. Gordon, 4 F.3d 1567, 1571 (10th Cir. 1993) ("Of the circuits that have directly addressed
the issue, all have held that a criminal defendant does not enjoy a Sixth Amendment right to counsel
at the presentence interview state. No circuit has explicitly adopted the contrary position."). But see
In re Carter, 848 A.2d. 281, 301 (Vt. 2004) (declaring that a Sixth Amendment right to counsel
applies to presentence interviews with probation officers).
83. See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 6, § 6.4(e) nn. 106-09.
84. Hoffman v. Arave, 236 F.3d 523, 540 (9th Cir. 2001).
85. See United States v. Dingle, Nos. 90-5083, 90-5084, 1991 WL 217017, at *3 (4th Cir.
Oct. 28, 1991); United States v. Johnson, 935 F.2d 47, 50 (4th Cir. 1991); United States v. Hicks,
948 F.3d 877, 885-86 (4th Cir. 1991).
86. See United States v. Woods, 907 F.2d 1540, 1543 (5th Cir. 1990); Brown v. Butler, 811
F.2d 938, 941 (5th Cir. 1987).
87. See United States v. Tisdale, 952 F.2d 934, 939-40 (6th Cir. 1992).
88. See United States v. Jackson, 886 F.2d 838, 844 (7th Cir. 1989) ("A federal probation
officer is an extension of the court and not an agent of the government. The probation officer does
not have an adversarial role in the sentencing proceedings.").
89. See United States v. Gonzalez-Mares, 752 F.2d 1485, 1489 (9th Cir. 1985); Baumann v.
United States, 692 F.2d 565, 578 (9th Cir. 1982).
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Tenth 90 Circuits have all held that no constitutional right to counsel exists
at routine, presentence interviews in non-capital cases.9 ' For example,
the Seventh Circuit held in United States v. Jackson,92 decided after the
adoption of the Guidelines, that no Sixth Amendment right to counsel
exists at a presentence interview because that interview is not adversarial
in nature, and therefore is not a "critical stage of the prosecution" in
which the defendant confronts the prosecutor or an agent of the prosecu-
tor. Many cases after Jackson adopted this reasoning.9 4
Despite the fact that no federal court has applied a Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel to presentence interviews, several circuits have
acknowledged the increased importance of the presentence interviews
under the Guidelines. 9 5 Still, these circuits declined to acknowledge a
constitutional right to counsel. The Ninth Circuit previously held that a
right to counsel did not exist at a non-capital presentence interview, 9 6 but
it has more recently exercised its supervisory power to require that pro-
bation officers permit attorneys to attend the presentence interview.97 The
Sixth Circuit, agreeing with the Ninth Circuit's solution, also declined
to extend the constitutional right.
90. See United States v. Gordon, 4 F.3d 1567, 1571-72 (10th Cir. 1993) ("Because the proba-
tion officer does not act on behalf of the government, we join those circuits that have concluded that
the presentence interview is not a critical stage of the proceeding within the meaning of the Sixth
Amendment." (citing Tisdale, 952 F.2d at 939-40; Jackson, 886 F.2d at 843-44)); United States v.
Smith, 929 F.2d 1453, 1458 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v. Rogers, 921 F.2d 975, 979-82 (10th
Cir. 1990).
91. The Eleventh Circuit has not yet ruled directly on the issue. See United States v. Simpson,
904 F.2d 607, 611 (1Ith Cir. 1990) ("[TJhree circuits have rejected this argument on the ground that
a presentence interview by a probation officer is not a critical stage of the criminal proceedings at
which the Sixth Amendment ensures representation.").
92. 886 F.2d 838 (7th Cir. 1989).
93. Id. at 843.
94. See, e.g., Rogers, 912 F.2d at 979-81; Tisdale, 952 F.2d at 940 ("We agree with the
prevailing analysis and, in particular, with Judge Kanne's well-reasoned opinion in United States v.
Jackson."); United States v. Dingle, Nos. 90-5083, 90-5084, 1991 WL 217017, at *3 (4th Cir. Oct.
28, 1991); see also Burns, supra note 2, at 553 (describing how other circuits have addressed the
issue of whether a presentence interview is a critical stage requiring the right to counsel by adopting
Jackson's reasoning).
95. The First, Second, Third, and Sixth Circuits have expressed an inclination to apply a right
to counsel to presentence interviews with probation officers, but have not directly ruled on the issue.
See, e.g., United States v. Tyler, 281 F.3d 84, 98 (3d Cir. 2002); United States v. Ocasio-Rivera, 991
F.2d 1, 3 n.3 (1st Cir. 1993) (declining to rule on the constitutional issue because it was not timely
raised, but opting to "leave the question open"); United States v. Cortes, 922 F.2d 123, 127 (2d Cir.
1990) (noting that, although under the Guidelines a "presentence interview may now be a 'critical
stage' of the proceedings necessitating the participation of counsel, . . . [w]e need not decide this
issue . . . because . . . Cortes's right was not violated"); United States v. Saenz, 915 F.2d 1046,
1048-49 (6th Cir. 1990) ("[Wie would be inclined to reject the view of some courts that a defend-
ant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel at his sentencing does not extend to the presentence inter-
view because the interview is not a critical stage of a criminal proceeding. . . . However, we need not
finally decide this issue because . .. the defendant's right was not violated in the instant case.").
96. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez-Mares, 752 F.2d 1485, 1489 (9th Cir. 1985); Bau-
mann v. United States, 692 F.2d 565, 578 (9th Cir. 1982).
97. United States v. Herrera-Figueroa, 918 F.2d 1430, 1433 (9th Cir. 1990).
98. Tisdale, 952 F.2d at 939-40.
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The Tenth Circuit, in United States v. Gordon, "join[ed] those cir-
cuits that have concluded that the presentence interview is not a critical
stage of the proceeding within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment." 99
The defendant in Gordon alleged that due to his counsel's ineffective
assistance at the presentence interview, he attempted to minimize his role
in the offense, and therefore did not receive the two-level downward
adjustment for acceptance of responsibility.'00 The court reasoned that a
presentence interview with a probation officer is not a critical stage un-
der Sixth Amendment jurisprudence because probation officers have "no
adversarial role in the sentencing proceedings; rather, the officer acts as a
neutral information gatherer for the judge."' 0 The court noted that while
the Guidelines have changed the sentencing process, the Guidelines have
not changed the probation officer's role as a non-adversarial agent of the
court.102
It was against this backdrop that Mr. Washington appealed to the
Tenth Circuit in United States v. Washington, alleging that his trial coun-
sel was constitutionally deficient for his failure to sufficiently advise Mr.
Washington about the nature and purpose of the presentence interview.' 03
II. UNITED STA TES V WASHINGTON
A. Procedural Posture
In May 1991, a jury convicted Mr. Patrick E. Washington on three
counts of possessing and distributing 61.98 grams of cocaine base, a vio-
lation of 21 U.S.C. § 83 1(a)(1).'0 Mr. Washington had retained attorney
Gary Long, II, to represent him throughout the trial.'0o
Mr. Long was not present at Mr. Washington's presentence inter-
view with the probation officer and did not advise Mr. Washington about
the purpose of the interview or the potential legal consequences of the
report that it generates.' 06 At the presentence interview, Mr. Washington
admitted to an increased drug distribution sales pattern of cocaine
base.10 7 Because of this incriminating admission, and additional infor-
mation from a confidential government informant who reported that Mr.
Washington possessed and distributed additional cocaine base, the proba-
99. 4 F.3d 1567, 1572 (10th Cir. 1993) (citing Tisdale, 952 F.2d at 939-40; United States v.
Jackson, 886 F.2d 838, 845 (7th Cir. 1998)).
100. Id. at 1571 (noting the defendant claimed his counsel failed to inform of his Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination during his presentence interview with a probation
officer).
101. Id. at 1571-72 (citing Jackson, 886 F.2d at 844).
102. Id. at 1572.




107. Id (noting Mr. Washington admitted to distributing between 0.5 and 1.0 kilograms of
cocaine base every three weeks during three months in 1990).
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tion officer's presentence report recommended a base offense level sig-
nificantly higher than it would have been without the incriminating ad-
missions.1os The district court relied on the presentence report and agreed
with the probation officer's base offense level recommendation.'0 9 The
court also imposed two two-level enhancements"o and sentenced Mr.
Washington to a total of 120 years."'
Mr. Washington appealed his conviction and sentence to the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals with the assistance of a public defender. 2 Mr.
Long failed to properly prosecute the appeal and was disbarred, during
the course of the appeal, from practicing before the Tenth Circuit."' The
Tenth Circuit affirmed Mr. Washington's conviction and sentence."14
In 1994, Mr. Washington filed the first in a series of post-conviction
motions seeking various types of relief from the district court's judg-
ment.' 15 Mr. Washington's last motion, a pro se § 2255 habeas motion,
alleged that his sentence was improper due to Mr. Long's deficient per-
formance. Mr. Washington claimed that Mr. Long's performance was
constitutionally deficient when he advised Mr. Washington to proceed to
trial rather than accept a plea deal for a ten-year sentence."'7 In 2008, the
district court appointed Mr. Schweiker as counsel to represent Mr. Wash-
ington.' The district court then held an evidentiary hearing on Mr.
108. Id. at 1253-54 (stating that the probation officer added an additional 2.5 kilograms of
cocaine base attributable to Mr. Washington because of his admissions at the presentence hearing,
and then added the additional 4 kilograms of cocaine base because of the informant's statement, for
a total distribution of 6.5 kilograms of cocaine base, and therefore recommended an applicable base
offense level of 40 pursuant to the USSG).
109. Id. at 1254.
110. Id. (noting that one enhancement was for obstruction of justice-before trial, Mr. Wash-
ington attempted to kill the informant-and one was for Mr. Washington's role in the offense as a
leader or organizer of a group with more than five participants).
111. Id. ("The district court sentenced Mr. Washington to three forty-year terms of imprison-




115. Id The district court recharacterized Mr. Washington's first post-conviction motion,
seeking information under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C § 552, as a habeas petition
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2255, and then denied it. Id. In 1997, Mr. Washington filed a § 2255 motion,
which the district court treated as a request to file a second or successive § 2255 motion and trans-
ferred it to the Tenth Circuit, who denied authorization. Id. Then, Mr. Washington filed a Rule
60(b)(6) motion seeking relief from the district court's recharacterization of his first post-conviction
motion, which the district court denied, and the Tenth Circuit vacated and denied authorization to
file. Id. In 2002, Mr. Washington filed a motion seeking a sentence reduction due to amendments to
the sentencing guidelines. Id. The district court granted Mr. Washington's motion and reduced his
sentence to thirty years for each count, served concurrently. Id. Mr. Washington renewed his Rule
60(b)(5) motion seeking relief from the district court's recharacterization of his first post-conviction
motion, which the district court denied for failure to meet the statutory requirements. Id. at 1255.
The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded, permitting Mr. Washington to start anew and file a § 2255
motion because its recharacterization of his first post-conviction motion as a § 2255 motion prevent-
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Washington's § 2255 motion.19 During that hearing, Mr. Schweiker al-
leged ineffective assistance of counsel for Mr. Long's failure to accom-
pany Mr. Washington to the presentence interview or advise Mr. Wash-
ington of the consequence of the interview.12 0 Despite objections from
the government as to the claim's untimeliness, the district court issued an
order allowing Mr. Washington to proceed with his new ineffective as-
sistance of counsel claim.121 The court held a second evidentiary hearing
on Mr. Washington's § 2255 claim and, in November 2008, issued an
order denying Mr. Washington's ineffective assistance of counsel claims
as to the plea deal and presentence interview.122 In denying Washington's
ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the district court said it was in-
clined to grant the motion because "the consequences of [the presen-
tence] meeting had more impact on the defendant's sentence than the
trial itself" 23 and because of Mr. Long's "complete lack of understand-
ing of the federal sentencing structure." 24 The district court ultimately
upheld Gordon while suggesting the need to re-examine its holding.125
Mr. Washington appealed the district court's decision.12 6 The Tenth
Circuit granted Mr. Washington a Certificate of Appealability (COA)
and expanded the COA's scope after oral arguments to allow Mr. Wash-
ington to proceed on the second question presented in his brief.127 The
Tenth Circuit considered two contentions raised by Mr. Washington: (1)
whether Mr. Washington's trial counsel was constitutionally deficient for
failing to properly advise Mr. Washington about the government's plea
offer; and (2) whether Mr. Washington's trial counsel's representation
was constitutionally deficient for his failure to understand the importance
of relevant conduct on Mr. Washington's potential sentence and for his
failure to advise Mr. Washington about the nature and purpose of the
presentence interview.' 2 8 The court also asked the parties to address





123. Id. at 1258 (alteration in original) (quoting District Court Order at 35-36 n.4, United
States v. Washington (D. Colo. Nov. 5, 2008)).
124. Id. at 1257 (quoting District Court Order, supra note 123, at 35-36 n.4).
125. Id. at 1257 ("[G]iven the clarity of the Tenth Circuit Court's pronouncement in Gordon,
this court cannot in good faith distinguish the facts to reach a different result. With respect, perhaps
it may be time to reexamine Gordon." (quoting District Court Order, supra note 123, at 35-36 n.4)).
126. Id. at 1256.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 1256-57.
129. Id. at 1256.
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B. The Tenth Circuit's Decision
1. Majority Opinion
In a 2-1 decision, the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded the dis-
trict court's order denying Mr. Washington's § 2255 motion. 130 The
Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court that Mr. Washington failed to
show that Mr. Long's performance was constitutionally deficient for
improperly advising Mr. Washington about the government's plea of-
fer.'3 1 However, the Tenth Circuit agreed with Mr. Washington that Mr.
Long's performance was constitutionally deficient under Strickland v.
Washington when Mr. Long failed to understand the basic mechanics of
the sentencing guidelines and failed to advise Mr. Washington about the
purpose and legal significance of the presentence interview.' 32 Further,
the court found that Mr. Washington was prejudiced by this deficient
conduct because it was reasonably probable that, but for Mr. Long's de-
ficient performance, Mr. Washington would have received a lower sen-
tence. 133
The Tenth Circuit acknowledged the district court opinion, which
stated an "inclination," but inability to grant Mr. Washington's motion
because of Gordon.134 The majority distinguished Gordon from Wash-
ington, holding that Gordon dealt with counsel's miscalculation of the
impact of relevant conduct on defendant's sentence, while the present
case dealt with counsel's failure to inform Mr. Washington about the
impact of relevant conduct on his sentence.135 Disagreeing with the dis-
trict court's interpretation of Gordon,13 6 the Tenth Circuit held that fail-
ure to "understand the mechanics of the sentencing guidelines," unlike
ordinary errors in applying sentencing guidelines, may rise to the level of
constitutionally deficient performance.137
The court reasoned that "[e]ven though the Court has limited the
necessity for counsel's presence as the spokesman for the defendant to
critical stages where defendant's expert adversary is present, the Consti-
tution's guarantee of counsel's guiding hand and advice regarding every
130. Id at 1263.
131. Id. at 1256-57 (noting that Mr. Washington failed to show that his counsel's allegedly
deficient performance prejudiced him because there was ample support in the record for the district
court's finding that the government never made a firm plea offer).
132. Id at 1253.
133. Id at 1263 (noting that without Mr. Washington's voluntary admissions during his presen-
tence interview, he would have qualified for the 2004 Crack Cocaine Amendment, resulting in a
two-level downward adjustment).
134. Id. at 1257 (citing United States v. Gordon, 4 F.3d 1567, 1571-72 (10th Cir. 1993)).
135. Id. at 1258-59 (arguing that Gordon merely held that counsel's performance cannot be
constitutionally deficient in miscalculating the impact ofrelevant conduct upon sentencing).
136. The district court interpreted Gordon as foreclosing the possibility that counsel's failure to
understand the basic structure of the sentencing guidelines could rise to the level of constitutionally
deficient under Strickland v. Washington. See id
137. Id at 1259 (citing United States v. Contreras-Castellanos, 191 F. App'x 773, 776 n.1
(10th Cir. 2006)).
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step of his defense proceedings remains intact."1 3 8 Accordingly, the court
held that while Mr. Washington did not have a right to the presence of
counsel at the presentence hearing, he had a right to counsel's advice
about the purpose of the presentence interview and the potential impact
of statements made about relevant conduct.' 39
2. Dissent
Judge Tacha dissented in part, and argued that Gordon foreclosed
Mr. Washington's claim because in that case the court held that a
"presentence interview is not a critical stage of the [criminal] proceeding
within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment."l 40 Judge Tacha further
argued that the majority's attempt to attach this holding solely to the
"precise moment of the presentence interview" itself, and not to the ad-
vice from counsel before the presentence interview, creates an arbitrary
distinction.141 Judge Tacha concluded by remarking, "the propriety of
[Gordon's] holding may be worthy of review."l 42
III. ANALYSIS
Although Washington's holding recognizes the increased im-
portance and the potential for prejudice of presentence interviews under
the Guidelines, in refusing to overturn Gordon, the court failed to ade-
quately protect defendants' Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Further-
more, Washington's holding created an unworkable rule that fails to en-
sure the long sought-after fairness in judicial proceedings. Under the
Guidelines, presentence interviews with probation officers are a "criti-
cal" stage under Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. As such, the Tenth
Circuit should overturn Gordon and extend the Sixth Amendment right
to counsel to presentence interviews with probation officers.
A. Implications ofUnited States v. Washington-An Unworkable Rule
that Fails to Protect a Defendant's Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel
The Tenth Circuit has held that in non-critical stages of criminal
proceedings, the Sixth Amendment does not guarantee criminal defend-
ants a right to counsel's presence.143 However, in Washington, the court
held that the Sixth Amendment does guarantee criminal defendants a
right to counsel's guidance and advice at every stage of the proceed-
ing,' 4 including "counsel's advice regarding the impact of the relevant
138. Id. at 1260 (citations omitted).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1263 (Tacha, J., dissenting in part) (alteration in original) (quoting United States v.
Gordon, 4 F.3d 1567, 1572 (10th Cir. 1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
141. Id.
142. Id. at 1264.
143. Gordon, 4 F.3d at 1571-72; United States v. Smith, 929 F.2d 1453, 1458 (10th Cir. 1991);
United States. v. Rogers, 921 F.2d 975, 981-82 (10th Cir. 1990).
144. Washington, 619 F.3d at 1260.
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conduct on the sentencing process, as well as the nature and purpose of
the presentence interview."1 4 5
Washington's holding places the Tenth Circuit into the category of
courts that have acknowledged the increased importance of presentence
interviews with probation officers under the Guidelines, but have de-
clined to extend the Sixth Amendment right to counsel's presence at the
proceeding, and in doing so, fall short of protecting defendants' constitu-
tional right to counsel.146 Both United States v. Herrera-Figueroa,47
where the Ninth Circuit exercised its supervisory power to require that
probation officers permit attorneys to attend the presentence interview,148
and United States v. Tisdale,149 where the Sixth Circuit agreed with the
Ninth Circuit's solution,5 o illustrate this short-coming. The courts' rea-
soning-that because defense counsel is permitted at the presentence
interview, it is unlikely that issues would arise from counsel's failure to
attend15 '-fails to adequately protect defendants' right to counsel be-
cause "extending the courtesy to counsel does nothing to extend a right
or even a voice to the truly interested party, the defendant." 5 2 Similarly,
Washington's holding fails to adequately protect a criminal defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to counsel because counsel's guidance and ad-
vice before a presentence interview, in addition to counsel's presence at
the interview itself, are necessary to ensure the integrity of criminal pro-
ceedings.
The Tenth Circuit's holding in Washington will be challenging to
administer. This is because the rule only works retrospectively, and be-
cause it will be difficult to determine whether counsel's advice was suf-
ficient. Courts will only be able to apply Washington's holding after a
criminal defendant challenges his counsel's assistance as to a completed
stage in the criminal proceeding."' A court will then have to undergo a
retrospective inquiry into whether the defendant received sufficient guid-
ance and advice about that stage,1 54 a determination that will be more
challenging than merely identifying whether counsel was present at a
stage.
145. Id at 1261.
146. See supra notes 95-98 and accompanying text.
147. 918 F.2d 1430 (9th Cir. 1990).
148. Id. at 1433.
149. 952 F.2d 934 (6th Cir. 1992).
150. Id. at 939-40 ("[R]equiring probation officers to honor a defendant's request that his
attorney be permitted to accompany him to the presentence interview will do much to ensure fairness
at a minimal cost to the system." (quoting Herrara-Figueroa, 918 F.2d at 1434) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
151. Id.
152. Metzger, supra note 2, at 1681.
153. See United States v. Washington, 619 F.3d 1252, 1254-55 (10th Cir. 2010) (describing
the process of Mr. Washington's post-conviction motions).
154. See, e.g., id at 1259.
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Administered pursuant to the Guidelines, presentence interviews
with a probation officer are a critical stage under the Sixth Amend-
ment.155 The Tenth Circuit's refusal to extend the right to counsel to this
increasingly important stage of criminal proceedings undermines the
protections guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment which seek to preserve
the integrity of the judicial process,' 6 and undoes the consistency and
fairness sought by the enactment of the Guidelines.' 57 Both the majority
and the dissent called for Gordon's re-examination, and the Tenth Circuit
should heed these calls158 and extend the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel to both the presentence interview and to counsel's advice before
the interview.
B. Presentence Interviews Are a Critical Stage of Criminal Proceedings
Under Sixth Amendment Jurisprudence
A presentence interview with a probation officer is a critical stage
under Sixth Amendment jurisprudence because: (1) it occurs after the
initiation of adversarial proceedings; (2) the defendant confronts an ad-
versary; (3) substantial prejudice is inherent in presentence interviews
conducted under the Guidelines; and (4) counsel's presence at the stage
would help the defendant mitigate or avoid the prejudice. Indeed, the
adoption of the Guidelines has created "new contexts . . . presenting the
same dangers that gave birth initially to the right itself."l 5 9 For example,
the same characteristics the Court relied on in holding that pretrial line-
ups and sentencing are critical stages under the meaning of the Sixth
Amendment are present in presentence interviews with probation offic-
ers.
In United States v. Wade,160 the Supreme Court expanded the right
to counsel to pretrial lineups after determining that counsel's presence
was necessary to preserve the defendant's right to a fair trial.16 ' In reach-
ing this decision, the Court noted the prejudice that inheres to pretrial
lineups because pretrial lineups are "riddled with innumerable dangers
and variable factors which might seriously, even crucially, derogate from
a fair trial." 62 Additionally, the Court noted that the absence of counsel
would undermine the defense's ability to meaningfully cross-examine
155. Id. at 1258; Metzger, supra note 2, at 1676-77.
156. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984) ("The benchmark for judging any
claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of
the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.").
157. See Bums, supra note 2, at 568-69.
158. See Washington, 619 F.3d at 1257 ("[Pjerhaps it may be time to reexamine Gordon."
(quoting District Court Order, supra note 123, at 35-36 n. 4)); see also id at 1264 (Tacha, J., dis-
senting) (noting that the "continued propriety of [Gordon's] holding may be worthy of review").
159. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 311 (1973).
160. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
161. Id. at 227.
162. Id. at 228-29 (describing the numerous instances of misidentification and the potential for
biased identification because of the manner in which the prosecution presents the accused in a pretri-
al line-up).
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witnesses and provide effective assistance at the trial itself.163 Further, the
Court considered as relevant the inability to cure potential prejudice that
exists in pretrial lineups. The Court noted that the defendant's "inability
effectively to reconstruct at trial any unfairness that occurred at the
lineup may deprive him of his only opportunity meaningfully to attack
the credibility of the witness' courtroom identification."'6 Lastly, the
Court noted the ability of counsel's presence at a pretrial line-up to avoid
such prejudice.165
Similarly, in Mempa v. Rhay,'66 the Supreme Court expanded the
right to counsel to federal sentencing.' 6 7 In defining sentencing as a "crit-
ical" stage, the Court was persuaded by the potential prejudice that is
inherent in sentencing, noting the extreme influence the sentencing
judge's recommendation has in determining the defendant's ultimate
sentence.168 Additionally, the Court considered as relevant the inability to
cure prejudice: an unrepresented defendant will lose certain rights, such
as the right to appeal, if not exercised at sentencing, and an unrepresent-
ed defendant will be unaware of opportunities to cure defects.'6 9
Presentence interviews with probation officers are a "critical" stage
under Sixth Amendment jurisprudence. First, presentence interviews
occur after the initiation of formal adversary proceedings.170 Presentence
interviews occur after the trial's completion and before the court imposes
its sentence. 7 1
Secondly, in presentence interviews, the defendant confronts an ad-
versary. The Guidelines have changed the role of probation officers, 172
shifting probation officers away from their non-adversarial role.173 The
expanded discretion afforded to probation officers contributes to the ad-
versarial nature of presentence interviews.174 Probation officers have
been called the "guardians of the guidelines" because of their role in col-
lecting the relevant factual information relating to the sentencing range,
and in making sentencing recommendations to the judge. 75 Probation
officers are required to make subjective determinations to arrive at a sin-
163. Id. at 230-32.
164. Id. at 23 1-32.
165. Id. at 236.
166. 389 U.S. 128 (1967).
167. See id. at 137.
168. See id. at 134-35.
169. Id at 136.
170. See Metzger, supra note 2, at 1668 (describing various points where adversary proceed-
ings commence: formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment).
171. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 6A 1.1(a) (2004).
172. See supra Part I.C.
173. See Metzger, supra note 2, at 1675.
174. See id; see also Bums, supra note 2, at 544.
175. See Daniel J. Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of Guidelines: Unacceptable Limits
on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1721-22 (1992) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Metzger, supra note 2, at 1673.
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gle version of facts to include in the presentence report, and then use that
determination to recommend a sentencing range.17 6 It is widely known
that the judgment calls that probation officers must make may be influ-
enced by the general attitude of the defendant.177 Accordingly, crucial
sentencing decisions previously made by judges acting under their expe-
rience and training in the law are now left to the discretion of probation
officers. 78 Even one "single finding by the probation officer can signifi-
cantly affect the ultimate sentencing range." 79
Despite numerous cases holding that a presentence interview is not
a "critical" stage due to the probation officer's neutrality as an agent of
the court, rather than an arm of the prosecution, 80 an examination of
presentence interviews compels the opposite conclusion.' 8' Critics of the
view that probation officers are neutral agents contend that probation
officers' bias and familiarity with the prosecution have led to too many
instances of upward adjustments in sentencing.' 8 2 Although the Guide-
lines permit a downward departure for acceptance of responsibility,'83
most of the adjustments provided for in the Guidelines are upward depar-
tures.184 Because of this, the majority of questions probation officers ask
a defendant at a presentence interview only can have an adverse impact
on the defendant, dictating the probation officer's role not as a "neutral
fact gatherer," but rather as an adversary.'8 ' The probation officer's role
as an adversary is underscored by the practice of probation officers sit-
ting at the prosecutor's table in court, giving the impression that the pro-
bation officer is a "surrogate prosecutor[]."' 86 When taken together, these
176. See, e.g., United States v. Saenz, 915 F.2d 1046, 1048 n.2 (6th Cir. 1990) ("The probation
officer's recommendations, which are based on his exercise of his judgment, become the point of
departure for disputes concerning the underlying facts of an offense as well as sentencing determina-
tions . . . ."); Bums, supra note 2, at 544; Donald A. Purdy, Jr. & Gustavo A. Gelpi, Federal Sen-
tencing Advocacy: Tips for Beginning Practitioners, 11 CRIM. JUST. 26, 30 (1997) ("[E]xplain to
your client the probation officer's role as a key player in the sentencing process and that the proba-
tion officer's perceptions of the client during the presentence interview may ultimately result in a
given recommendation to the court. . . .").
177. See, e.g., Purdy & Gelpi, supra note 176, at 30 ("Instruct your client to always be courte-
ous towards the [probation] officer.").
178. See Bums, supra note 2, at 545 ("[U]nder the Guidelines ... many of the crucial judgment
calls in sentencing are now made, not by the court, but by probation officers . . . ." (quoting United
States v. O'Meara, 895 F.2d 1216, 1223 (8th Cir. 1990) (Bright, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part))).
179. United States v. Herrera-Figueroa, 918 F.2d 1430, 1434 (9th Cir. 1990).
180. See supra notes 82-90 and accompanying text.
181. See Metzger, supra note 2, at 1673; Burns, supra note 2, at 561 (discussing the "faulty
assumption that probation officers do not operate as adversaries").
182. See Bums, supra note 2, at 562-65.
183. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1(a) (2004) ("If the defendant clearly
demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense, decrease the offense level by 2 levels.").
184. Bums, supra note 2, at 564 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 3).
185. Id.
186. United States v. Turner, 203 F.3d 1010, 1014 (7th Cir. 2000) (suggesting that a separate
table could be placed in the courtroom to ensure the probation officer appears equally available to
the judge and both parties).
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circumstances suggest that probation officers are part of the prosecution
team. 187
Third, substantial prejudice is inherent in presentence interviews
conducted under the Guidelines because of (1) the increased importance
of presentence interview; (2) the technical complexity of the Guidelines;
(3) the trial-like nature of presentence interviews; and (4) the inability to
cure potential prejudice.
1. Increased Importance
Under the Guidelines, presentence interviews have an expanded im-
portance. The probation officer uses the interview to create a presentence
report, which plays a central role in determining a defendant's sentence.
Additionally, judges are increasingly relying on the substance and rec-
ommendations contained in the report."8 Further, the presentence report
continues to impact the defendant after sentencing.189 For example, the
Bureau of Prisons relies on the presentence report for many of its deci-
sions. 190 Also, the presentence report is required to be part of the record
on appeal.1 91
2. Technical Complexity
Additionally, the technical complexity present in the Guidelines in-
creases the likelihood that an unrepresented defendant will commit sen-
tencing suicide, and make unnecessary admissions that can result in up-
ward adjustments to his sentence. An unrepresented defendant is unlikely
to understand the implications of his admissions at a presentence inter-
view,' 9 2 which can result in upward variations of months or years in the
defendant's sentence.' 93 The technical complexity of the Guidelines can
be illustrated by providing a few examples of how a defendant's admis-
sions, non-admissions, or conduct during a presentence interview can
have a significant effect on the defendant's sentence.
For example, during a presentence interview with a probation of-
ficer, if a defendant provides "materially false information to a probation
officer in respect to a presentence or other investigation for the court,"
187. See Bums, supra note 2, at 561-64.
188. See id. at 545.
189. See THOMAS W. HUTCHISON ET AL., FEDERAL SENTENCING & PRACTICE § 6Al.1 cmt. 3
(2012 ed.)
190. See id (explaining the Bureau of Prisons' reliance on the presentence report as the key
and sometimes exclusive source of information about the defendant for decisions such as a defend-
ant's assignment to a correctional facility, assessment of the incarceration fee, and eligibility for
early release from a drug treatment program).
191. See Metzger, supra note 2, at 1676 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3742(d)(2) (2003)).
192. See id. at 1679 ("[A] defendant's 'casual, ill-considered or inaccurate answers, offered [at
the presentence interview] without a full understanding of the potential consequences, may result in
a substantial increase in the recommended period of incarceration."' (quoting United States v. Herre-
ra-Figueroa, 918 F.2d 1430, 1436 (9th Cir. 1990))).
193. Bums, supra note 2, at 528.
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the defendant can receive an increase in the offense level by two levels
for obstructing or impeding the administration of justice.19 4 Two Ninth
Circuit cases demonstrate the gravity of a defendant's admission during a
presentence interview, in which a mischaracterization of the defendant's
criminal record to a probation officer resulted in the two-level increase
for obstruction of justice.' 95
Additionally, in arriving at a sentencing recommendation, a proba-
tion officer may consider criminal conduct for which the defendant has
not been convicted.196 The Guidelines give the court considerable discre-
tion to "consider, without limitation, any information concerning the
background, character and conduct of the defendant, unless otherwise
prohibited by law." 97 Accordingly, an unrepresented criminal defendant
may admit, as Mr. Washington did, to crimes for which he was not con-
victed, and such admissions may result in an increase in his sentencing
recommendation. Furthermore, an unrepresented defendant may admit to
other background information relating to the character and conduct of the
defendant that can influence the probation officer's sentencing recom-
mendation.
3. Trial-Like Nature
Furthermore, the "trial-like" nature of the presentence interview
supports the conclusion that the presentence interview, upon which the
result of the sentencing proceeding truly rests, is a critical stage requiring
counsel. 98 Because of the potential harm resulting from the presentence
interview, defense attorneys are often encouraged to treat a presentence
interview as if it were a trial.'99 The defense attorney has two weeks to
object to the probation officer's presentence report, and the court will
resolve any remaining dispute by hearing arguments from both parties.2 00
Such hearings often turn on the word of one party against the other, and,
unfortunately, the court's familiarity with the probation officer as an
194. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3C1.1, cmt. 4(H) (2011).
195. Herrera-Figueroa, 918 F.2d at 1435 (citing United States v. Christman, 894 F.2d 339,
342 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Baker, 894 F.2d 1083, 1084 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting that the
defendant received a two-point increase in offense level for mischaracterizing his record even
though the probation officer had access to the defendant's record while the defendant did not)).
196. See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § IBI.3, cmt. 1 (2010) ("The principles
and limits of sentencing accountability under this guideline are not always the same as the principles
and limits of criminal liability. Under subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2), the focus is on the specific acts
and omissions for which the defendant is to be held accountable in determining the applicable guide-
line range, rather than on whether the defendant is criminally liable for an offense as a principal,
accomplice, or conspirator.").
197. See id. §B 1.4 (2004).
198. See United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 314 (1973).
199. See Purdy & Gelpi, supra note 176, at 29 ("[C]onduct yourself as a professional in your
dealings with the probation officer . . ; convey an image of informed, prepared professionalism, and
supply written documentation of your position on guideline application (and dispute resolution) with
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.").
200. Metzger, supra note 2, at 1674-75.
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agent of the court can lead the court to credit the probation officer's tes-
201timony.
4. Inability to Cure Defects
Lastly, the "irrevocable consequences" of admissions made and
conduct at a presentence interview further add support to the critical na-
ture of this stage of proceedings. 202 It is difficult for defendants to chal-
203
lenge the contents of the presentence report, increasing the potential
for prejudice in presentence interviews. In United States v. Ash,204 the
Supreme Court emphasized as important the extent to which an oppor-
tunity exists to "cure defects" caused by counsel's absence.20 5 A defense
attorney who was not present at the presentence interview will have a
difficult time successfully challenging information contained in the
presentence report at a hearing, given the deference to probation officers'
206testimony. Additionally, because probation officers often make subjec-
tive determinations in the presentence report, it is difficult for a defense
attorney who was not present at the interview to effectively challenge
these determinations. 207 The inability to cure defects caused by the ab-
sence of counsel at a presentence interview illustrates why merely ex-
tending the right to counsel's advice before the interview, as the Tenth
Circuit did in Washington, fails to adequately remedy the possibility of
prejudice inherent in presentence interviews.
Fourth, the ability of counsel's presence at the presentence inter-
views to help the defendant mitigate or avoid the prejudice illustrates the
critical nature of the proceeding. The presence of counsel at a prcsen-
tence interview can significantly reduce the risk of the defendant com-
mitting sentencing suicide,208 or prejudicing himself by making state-
ments or acting in a manner that leads to upward adjustments in the sen-
tencing range. Case law demonstrates that "an uncounselled defendant
runs the risk of unwittingly increasing his or her sentence."2 09 Washing-
ton illustrates this point effectively. It is difficult to imagine that with
201. Id. at 1678, 1696 (questioning "how counsel could effectively rebut claims about state-
ments her client made, or the demeanor her client had, at a presentence interview that counsel did
not attend").
202. Id. at 1663.
203. See id at 1674.
204. 413 U.S. 300 (1973).
205. Id. at 315-16 (noting that if such an opportunity to cure defects caused by counsel's
absence exists, despite the fact that the risks inherent in a particular confrontation will still remain,
the stage is not critical).
206. Metzger, supra note 2, at 1696.
207. Id. at 1678 n.275 (discussing the difficulty that a defense attorney, who was not present at
a presentence interview, will have in effectively cross-examining the probation officer to undermine
his description of facts or conduct included in the report).
208. In re Carter, 848 A.2d 281, 296 (Vt. 2004) (discussing petitioner's statements at his
presentence interview where "in a single paragraph he ensured that he would spend virtually all of
his adult life in jail").
209. Id. at 298; see also United States v. Herrera-Figueroa, 918 F.2d 1430, 1434 (9th Cir.
1990).
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counsel present at his presentence interview, Mr. Washington would
have admitted to his previous drug dealing. Indeed, Washington "had
absolutely nothing to gain and a great deal to lose by volunteering the
information."210
CONCLUSION
The Sixth Amendment right to counsel is an evolving doctrine, and
the changes in federal sentencing due to the adoption of the Guidelines
compel the right to counsel be expanded to presentence interviews with
probation officers. In Washington, the Tenth Circuit recognized the im-
portance of presentence interviews and the potential for prejudice inher-
ent in post-Guideline presentence interviews. However, in refusing to
overturn Gordon, the court created an unworkable rule that fails to en-
sure the long sought-after fairness in judicial proceedings and fails to
adequately protect defendants' Sixth Amendment right to counsel.
Elizabeth Phillips'
210. United States v. Washington, 619 F.3d 1252, 1257 (2010) (quoting District Court Order,
supra note 123, at 32).
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